Journal of History and Classics:The struggle for Greece: Marathon and Artemision

The Struggle for Greece: Marathon and Artemision

by Garrett

In 491 BC, King Darius of Persia decided to take control of the Aegean. He first demanded the usual tokens of submission, earth and water.^[1] Most city-states agreed, but Athens and Sparta indicated their answer by executing the heralds like common criminals!^[2] This led to confrontation—first on the plain of Marathon, and later, ordered by his son Xerxes, a large sea-battle off the coast from Artemision in 480 BC. The classical writer Herodotus provides the most comprehensive source on the Greco-Persian wars; however, if he didn’t know why a particular decision was made, he improvised!

When he received news of his messengers’ demise, Darius was understandably angered. According to Herodotus, the Persians sent 600 triremes,^[3] which could carry around 24,000 soldiers;^[4] 30 or 40 of these ships were turned into horse transports,^[5] which collectively might have carried around 1000 cavalry.^[6] He wanted to punish them and restore the feared tyrant Hippias as dictator in Athens once more. Darius chose the plain of Marathon because it was suitable for deployment of his cavalry.^[7] “Some modern commentators even suggest (there is no evidence) that Persian strategy was to draw the Athenians out of Athens so that either … the city could fall by treachery, or … part of the Persian force could be transported to Athens while the rest of it pinned the Athenian force down at Marathon.”^[8]

The Plain of Marathon

(map coming soon)

The Athenians’ traditional response to invasion was to confront the enemy rather than try to withstand a siege. Not only was this more honourable, the Persians were known experts at siege warfare! Before heading off to Marathon, Athens desperately sent a runner to Sparta to ask for aid.^[9] Due to religious purposes, the Spartans were forbidden to do any military activities until the full moon!^[10] However, after this period they marched for Marathon at once.^[11] The Persians feared the arrival of the Spartans, who were renowned for their military prowess. Some sources (not Herodotus) tell of a combined force of 9000 Athenians and 1000 Plataians on the battlefield.^[12] Despite this, the combined Greek forces still had inferior numbers to those of the Persians. The Athenians countered the Persians’ superior numbers by thinning and thus weakening the middle ranks to about four men deep, but leaving the wings at the proper strength of eight deep; by doing this they were able to spread their men out over the same length as the enemy.^[13] This prevented the Persian ranks, with their greater length, from wrapping around them and penning them in.^[14] The skirmishing at Marathon was lengthy; eventually, the Persian centre began gaining ground. The Greek wings were also successful, then turned and focussed their thrust on those who broke through their ranks.^[15] They chased after the fleeing Persians and picked them off; when the Persians made it to the coast, the Greeks began burning the ships.^[16]

It is hard to believe that the Persians, while chasing the Greek centre and eventually moving further inland, could then turn and flee back to the sea when they were attacked from the rear! It is possible that the centre force, “realising that its wings had broken and fled, also tried to return across the battlefield, and was thus taken in both flanks by the victorious Greek wings.”^[17] Fleeing was a monumental task in itself; the Persians likely had to go about 5 km to get to the ships. Despite the Greeks’ attempts, the Persians managed to sail after losing only seven of their ships.^[18] But rather than fleeing altogether, they had a double purpose: not only were they saving themselves from being wiped out, they were going to attempt to sail back to Athens and take the city before the Athenians could reach it on foot.^[19] If they beat the Athenian troops home, they would still have won, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield. Sailing back to Athens was a 100 km trip that would take 10 hours—about the same length of time it would take the land forces to march there. However, the indomitable Athenians arrived first. The Persians were already so weakened by the Greek forces that they had no choice—they didn’t even attempt a landing and sailed home!^[20] As for the religiously disqualified Spartans, they arrived after a lengthy three-day march, saw nothing but dead Persians piled in a heap, praised the Athenians’ prowess, and promptly went back home!^[21] According to Herodotus, “the losses were 6400 Persians for 192 Athenians”^[22]—an incredible feat.

Unlike the Spartans, the Athenians did not train a dedicated fighting force; they were no more skilled at combat than the Persians. However, the horrific thought of what would happen if they lost probably drove them to great acts of bravery.^[23] Not only would the Persians have set up Hippias in Athens as tyrant once more, they would have demanded tribute, and forced Athenians to serve in the army of their hated conquerors.^[24] After this victory, Themistocles, the Athenian statesman, promoted building a larger navy. If Darius sent a superior force they might have to evacuate the people by sea. Sure enough, even after this stunning defeat, Darius was only more determined to conquer Athens and Sparta. He wanted to organise a full-scale invasion. However a few matters delayed him, namely an uprising in Egypt, a quarrel about the succession, and then his death. It was now up to his son Xerxes to finish the job.

Artemision

(map coming soon)

Xerxes built bridges, dug a canal through the Athos peninsula, and overall prepared the routes so his troops could travel unimpeded. He was planning a dual land and sea invasion: his men would march to Thermopylae, while the ships sailed around the coastline towards Artemision. When the Athenians learned of this impending attack in 481, they turned to the famous oracle of Apollo at Delphi. They were told to flee, but despite this they made up their minds to attempt a sea battle! They formed a league with the other states willing to resist, and made them vow not to abandon their allies. They put the Spartans in charge. They called for help from Argos, Syracuse, Corcyra and Crete, but it was a futile effort. The spies sent to Sardis were caught, but Xerxes merely showed them the grandeur of his army (hoping to scare them) and let them go.

The Greek land and sea forces moved together so that each could support the other; this prevented the Persians landing men and wiping out the land forces, and simultaneously prevented the Persian navy from merely avoiding the Greek fleet and sailing around the coast to rejoin the army. Through this method of double blockading, both the army and navy of their enemy became significantly reduced. “Herodotus implies that the fleet of 271 triremes (127 of which were Athenian) … reached its station during the eleven days between Xerxes departure from Therma [with his army] and the departure of his fleet.”

When the Persians finally made an appearance, 400 warships and a myriad of other craft were missing. The Greeks assumed that the ships were wrecked due to the recent weather and the fact that the ships were fewer in number than reports had indicated. A traitor said that 200 Persian ships were being sent down the coast; it was decided that at midnight they would send their entire fleet off after them, as they had a greater force. The Greeks chose to launch a head-on attack simultaneously, perhaps to prevent the rest of the Persian fleet from realising where they were going and penning them between their two fleets—and they probably didn’t want to lose face by appearing to flee! Herodotus says it was also to learn how the Persian diekplous, a special warship, would affect future naval confrontations. Logically, to the Persians a direct attack sounded crazy, so they eagerly went out to fight. Herodotus says the Greeks used a defensive formation; what formation is open to debate. It could be that they grouped themselves in such a way that the enemy ships couldn’t find a gap to target. In this way the Persians would be forced to ram, meaning that “the speed and manoeuvrability of … [the diekplous was] of no advantage.”

The Greeks managed to commandeer 30 ships, and the Persians were left to retreat in amazement. Meanwhile another storm dissuaded the Greeks from following the other 200; the gods intervened, and the ships were destroyed in the storm. On top of this, an additional 53 Athenian ships arrived! However, despite these lucky victories, the Persians still had superior numbers, which in the end won the day for them. A mere 324 Greek ships were no match for the Persians’ fleet of 653. In the final clash, the Greeks were getting the upper hand, but damages prompted them to flee the battle.

The Greeks won an early victory against incredible odds on land at Marathon, where they had slaughtered 6400 Persians at the cost of only 192 of their own men. Darius’ small punishment force had been beaten off, and Greece was safe for a few years due to Darius dealing with his own troubles back home. When his son Xerxes took up the kingship, he attacked with greater strength. The Greeks reached little more than a stalemate at Artemision. Their amazing luck at Marathon ran out here—indeed the god Apollo had advised against a sea battle, and they had foolishly ignored him. Sunken and defeated, the Greeks limped off to desperately prepare for the imminent invasion. The battle for Marathon had been won, but the crippling defeat at Artemision negated this gain.

References

1. ^ Peter Green, The Greco-Persian Wars, 2nd ed., Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996, p.66
2. ^ Herodotus, The Histories, ed. and trans. A.D. Godley, retrieved 19 April 2004 from http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hdt.+6.95
3. ^ Stuart Lawrence, 201.117 Warfare in Ancient Greece and Rome Study Guide I, Palmerston North: Massey University, 2004, p.45
4. ^ Herodotus, 6.48.
5. ^ Herodotus, 6.102.
6. ^ Lawrence, p.46.
7. ^ Herodotus, 6.105-106.
8. ^ Herodotus, 6.106.3.
9. ^ Lawrence, p.47.
10. ^ A.R. Burn, Persia & the Greeks, 2nd ed., London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1984, p.249
11. ^ J.F. Lazenby, The Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C., Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1993, p.64.
12. ^ Herodotus, 6.113.
13. ^ Lazenby, p.69.
14. ^ Herodotus, 6.115.
15. ^ Lawrence, p.49.
16. ^ Herodotus,6.116
17. ^ Herodotus, 6.120
18. ^ Herodotus, 6.117
19. ^ Lazenby, p.80
20. ^ Lawrence, p.50

Bibliography

• Burn, A.R., Persia & the Greeks, 2nd ed., London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1984.
• Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars, 2nd ed., Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996.
• Herodotus, The Histories, ed. and trans. A.D. Godley, retrieved 19 April 2004 from http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hdt.
• Lawrence, Stuart, 201.117 Warfare in Ancient Greece and Rome Study Guide I, Palmerston North: Massey University, 2004.
• Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C., Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1993.